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Abstract
We present two classroom experiments on technology licensing. The first classroom exper-
iment introduces the concept of royalty stacking. The students learn that non-cooperative
pricing of royalties for complementary intellectual property rights leads to a double-
marginalization effect. Cooperation solves the problem and is welfare improving. The sec-
ond classroom experiment introduces students to cross-licensing. It shows that reciprocal
royalty payments dampen competition. The classroom experiments stimulate discussions
of technology licensing, intellectual property rights, different royalty structures, patent
pools and technology standards. We present the experimental procedures, and suggests
routes for the discussion.
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1. Introduction
As technology in on the rise in today’s business world, intellectual property rights become
increasingly important. This is illustrated by the development of the number of granted
patents over time. At the European and United States patent offices (EPO and USPTO)
the number of patents roughly doubled during the last decade.1 However, technologies
protected by patents are not only used by the patent owners but also potentially by others.
Hence, the increasing importance of patents in particular, and intellectual property rights
(IPRs) in general, also increases the importance of licensing. In this article, we present
two classroom experiments on two phenomena related to licensing.
The first classroom experiment discusses royalty stacking (see, e.g., Shapiro, 2000).
The problem of royalty stacking is essentially a problem of pricing complements, dating
back to Cournot (1838). It is a variant of the double (multiple) marginalization problem
(see, e.g., Tirole, 1988). In the case of licensing, it emerges when producers require access
to technologies protected by multiple patents with dispersed ownership. In that case, the
total royalty for access to all patents is higher compared to a situation where the ownership
of the required patents is concentrated.
Patents protect technologies rather than products. As many products actually combine
multiple technologies, a producer often requires access to multiple patents. This is quite
natural to occur as inventors stand on the shoulders of giants and often apply previous
inventions to reach new discoveries. For example, according to a US government report,
a typical smartphone uses from 50,000 to 250,000 patented technologies (GAO, 2013).
Similar observations can be made for other products in the information technology sector
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2007). And even for one specific technology, technology standards
can rely on several hundred patents (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008).
Similar to the standard double-marginalization problem, royalty stacking occurs be-
cause one patent owner does not take into account the effect of its royalty choice on other
patent owners. The resulting problem is not only welfare-decreasing but leads to an in-
1Source: PATSTAT, Spring 2021.
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ferior outcome for everyone involved: IPR owners, producers and consumers. One way to
solve the problem is to create a patent pool that demands only one royalty for access to
the essential patents (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2004).
At this point, the second classroom experiment enters the picture. The second exper-
iment is about cross-licensing, for example, in a patent pool. This experiment illustrates
that when two competitors require access to each other’s patents, a reciprocal royalty can
be used to dampen competition between them. Cross-licensing is a common practice in
a variety of industries as shown by Taylor et al. (1973) already five decades ago. Under-
standing cross-licensing is therefore essential for anyone working on or with technology
licensing.
Both experiments can be embedded well in a discussion on licensing from a business
perspective. They can also be applied for an antitrust discussion on licensing. The first
experiment shows that coordination with owners of complementing IPRs can be beneficial
in order to decrease transaction costs. Moreover, it is not only individually beneficial
but also positive for welfare. Hence, from an antitrust perspective, coordination, e.g.
by forming patent pools, is considered in principle positively. The second experiment
then shows that if the owners of complementing IPRs are also competitors, the access to
these assets affects the competitive situation. This is obviously important from a business
perspective, but is likely to be harmful for consumers and will, hence, be scrutinized by
competition authorities.
The experiments can also be used to discuss different kinds of royalties, i.e., per-unit,
ad valorem or fixed payments. In principle, both problems presented by the experiments
would vanish at the margin with a fixed payment. This observation is a good starting point
to make the students think about the benefits and costs of (different kinds of) variable
royalties. Furthermore, we use the experiments to motivate discussions on patent pools,
patent thickets, technology standards and standard-essential patents.
The target courses for the experiments are innovation courses for business and eco-





The experiment takes around 60 minutes including discussions. The instructions and
a list of required material can be found in the Appendix. In the experiment, a student
takes the role of a patent owner that demands a royalty for access to its patent from a
manufacturer. The manufacturer requires access to two patents in order to sell its product.
Hence, two patent owners, i.e., students, form a pair. The manufacturer itself is passive. Its
production depends on the sum of the royalties. We use a simple linear demand function
q = 12 − r1 − r2, where ri is the royalty of patent owner i in ¿ (or another currency).
Each patent owner maximizes its individual profit, which is given by πi = riq.
We start by distributing the instructions (see the Appendix A.2).2 The students are
asked to read them carefully. Then, in order to match two patent owners, we recommend
to print numbers on pieces of paper. In order to assign students a unique ID, we bring
an “A” and a “B” version of the numbers such that A1 is matched to B1. We usually
distribute the numbers among the students such that a pair sits relatively far away from
one another. This impedes communication in the non-cooperative rounds, and has the
side effect that students mingle and get to know each other in the cooperative round. We
performed the experiment with up to 80 students, i.e., 40 groups. For even larger classes
one may consider forming groups representing one decision maker.
We experienced that it is beneficial to either write the demand schedule on the black-
board or use the projector for it. After the students are done reading, it is important to
explain the procedure once more and to clarify questions.
We also use the pieces of paper with the IDs as record sheets and ask students to write
down their decision on the backside. After each round, they submit their decision, and we
record the decisions in a prepared Excel sheet.
2In our main description, we focus on an execution in the classroom. In Section 4, we provide some
input for online settings.
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The experiment consists of two phases: the non-cooperative and cooperative phase.
We usually run two rounds of the non-cooperative phase as described in the instructions.
The first round is then kind of a practice round, as it helps the students to understand
the set-up. A second round of the non-cooperative set-up can also be interesting, because
the behavior of the students often shows some dynamics as students quickly realize the
interdependence of the decisions. Students usually require around 10–15 minutes to answer
the first round, and around five minutes in the second round.
In the second phase, the pair of patent owners cooperate and demand a joint royalty
that is equally split. The patent owners are asked to sit together and to determine the
joint royalty.
2.2. Discussion
We usually do not strictly differentiate between the procedure and discussion. After
each round, we ask students for their considerations. However, we spare a discussion of
the main mechanisms until all rounds are performed. Table 2.1 presents the result during
one of our courses.
Avg. sum of royalties Avg. quantity Avg. joint profits
Round 1: separation 7.750 4.250 32.250
Round 2: separation 8.125 3.875 30.125
Round 3: coordination 6.000 6.000 36.000
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of an exemplary realization (amounts in ¿).
We typically observe royalties of around 4¿ in the separation rounds. There is usu-
ally some variation as some students demand less, because they realize early on that a
symmetric strategy with royalties of 3¿ is the cooperative solution. On the other hand,
other students are thinking more about their own profits and demand a higher royalty,
especially, if the paired patent owner went for the cooperative solution in the first round.
In contrast, there is usually very little variation in the third round. Most of the students
quickly understand that a (total) royalty of 6¿ maximizes the joint profit.
We use the latter observation as a start for the discussion and ask why royalties of 3¿
for each patent owner do not constitute an equilibrium in the separation case. One way
5
to visualize it, is to show the best-response functions for patent owner 1 if patent owner
2 would choose a royalty of 3¿:
r1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
π1 0 8 14 18 20 20 18 14 8 0
π2 0 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0
π1 + π2 0 32 35 36 35 32 27 20 11 0
Table 2.2: Best response of patent owner 1 if patent owner 2 sets r2 = 3 (amounts in ¿).
Table 2.2 shows that joint profits are maximized if r1 = 3. However, a symmetric
strategy ri = 3 does not constitute an equilibrium, because if patent owner 1 expects
r2 = 3, then it will be profit maximizing to respond by choosing r1 = 4 or r1 = 5. This
happens not only at the expense of the other patent owner; even worse, the negative effect
on π2 is larger than the positive effect on π1, such that welfare decreases. By maximizing
π1, patent owner 1 exerts an externality on patent owner 2. Clearly, the same is true for
patent owner 2. Patent owner 2 also maximizes its profits and exerts an externality on
patent owner 1. Consequently, both set a royalty above the cooperative optimal royalty
level (3¿). This problem emerges because individual patent owners do not internalize the
externalities, i.e., they do not take into account the negative effect of its royalty on the
profit of the other patent owner.
The remaining question is then to determine the equilibrium. Table 2.3 shows that
none of the patent owners has an incentive to deviate from a royalty of 4¿.
r1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
π1 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 0
π2 0 28 24 20 16 12 8 4 0 0
π1 + π2 0 35 36 35 32 27 20 11 0 0
Table 2.3: Best response of patent owner 1 if patent owner 2 sets r2 = 4 (amounts in ¿).
This observation shows that fragmented ownership of patent rights stacks individual
royalties on one another. The sum of the royalties is higher compared to a situation with
concentrated ownership of patent rights. Fragmented ownership creates the problem of
royalty stacking.
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Once the royalty-stacking problem is clarified, remedies to the problem can be dis-
cussed. First, we usually introduce the concept of patent pools. A patent pool is a con-
sortium in which owners of complementing patents pool their patents. The pool then
licenses the patent rights to pool members and external parties. It can therefore also in-
clude a form of cross-licensing. Patent pools can be discussed from a competition policy
and law perspective, for example, against the background of patents that complement and
substitute each other. The introduction of patent pools can also be used to talk about
technology standards, as standard-essential patents by definition are complements.
Second, different royalty structures can, in theory, remedy the royalty-stacking prob-
lem. In particular, demanding a fixed fee instead of a variable royalty, would solve the
production inefficiency. However, whereas that is true for the stylized environment of the
experiment, there are also downsides of fixed fees. Hence, the discussion can be used to
motivate or relate to a lecture discussing different fees in royalty contracts, or to a lecture
on the market for innovation in more general.
Finally, we like to challenge students to think about the mechanism of double margins
beyond licensing. The effects originate from the fact that the patents are complements.
Whereas joint pricing of substitutes leads to higher consumer prices, joint pricing of
complements leads to lower prices. Hence, joint pricing of complements does not benefit
only the producers but also consumers. We highlight that the same mechanism is present
in a variety of settings. Our favorite example for a business-student audience, is pricing
along the vertical supply chain within organizations. Pricing inputs in the supply chain is
by definition pricing of complements. This reminds students of their lectures on transfer
pricing, and clarifies that the mechanism is not exclusively observed in the licensing case.
3. Cross-licensing
3.1. Procedure
The second experiment on cross-licensing will take around 60–70 minutes including
discussions. The instructions can be found in Appendix A.3.
In the experiment, each student takes the role of a manufacturer. Two manufacturers
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are matched with one another at the start and remain matched throughout the experi-
ment. The manufacturers compete with each other on a product market. However, they
require access to technologies of a competitor. The technologies are protected by patents.
Therefore, they enter into a cross-licensing agreement with a reciprocal royalty fee f per
unit sold. For simplicity, we assume that the manufacturer has no additional costs (or,
alternatively, only fixed costs).
The manufacturers can choose any even number between 0¿ and 24¿ as their price.
The demand function for the two companies depends on the difference between the prices
and is given by Table 3.1.
p1 − p2 (in ¿) >10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 <-10
q1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
q2 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
Table 3.1: Demand function depending on p1 and p2.
The experiment starts with the distribution of the instructions and students reading
them carefully. Then, we use numbered pieces of paper to match the students. It is recom-
mended to match students that sit relatively far away from each other in order to hinder
communication such that explicit cooperation does not affect the result. We performed
the experiment with up to 80 students, i.e., 40 groups. As with Experiment 1, one may
consider forming groups representing one decision maker for even larger classes.
Afterwards, we prepare an Excel sheet, and either write the key ingredients of the
set-up on the blackboard or display them on the projector. After the students finished
reading, it is important to explain the procedure once more and to clarify questions.
We again use the pieces of papers with the IDs as record sheets and ask students to
write down their decision on the back. After each round, they submit their decision, and
we return the pieces of paper after we entered it into our Excel sheet.
The experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase, the reciprocal fee equals
f = 2¿. In the second phase, it equals f = 6¿. We usually run two to three rounds of
phase 1, because it takes students a while to figure out the optimal strategy. Whereas
the first round takes the students usually around 10–15 minutes, the other rounds take
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significantly less time.
We typically only run one round of phase 2. Because the set-up is very similar to
phase 1, students understand the basic strategies involved, and tend to answer also rather
quickly. Even though playing only one round makes a coordination on prices of 24¿
theoretically more likely, students are typically still in competition mode and usually not
all go for that choice.
3.2. Discussion
Similar to Experiment 1, we do not strictly differentiate between the experiment and
the discussion. After each round, we ask students for their considerations, but we spare a
discussion of the main mechanisms until all rounds are performed.
Table 3.2 presents the result during one of our courses.
Average price Average joint profits
Round 1: f = 2 18.875 337.000
Round 2: f = 2 16.250 290.000
Round 3: f = 2 14.250 275.000
Round 4: f = 6 17.375 351.000
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of an exemplary realization (amounts in ¿)
The equilibrium prices in phase 1 equals 14¿. We typically observe that the prices
in the first rounds are significantly higher, because students see quickly that cooperating
and setting 24¿ each is jointly optimal.
How intensely the individual rounds should be discussed, depends on the group size.
In small groups, our experience shows that students sustain a higher level of cooperation.
Therefore, for small classes we prefer to show that 24¿ does not constitute an equilibrium
directly after round 1. For larger classes, that is less of a problem, and the discussion can
be delegated to the end of phase 1.
p1 24 22 20 18 16 14
π1 240 256 264 264 256 240
π2 240 200 160 120 80 40
π1 + π2 480 456 424 384 336 280
Table 3.3: Best response of manufacturer 1 if manufacturer 2 sets p2 = 24 (all amounts in ¿).
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In order to show that 24¿ does not constitute an equilibrium, we analyze the best
response to the competitor’s price of 24¿. Table 3.3 shows that the best response equals
a price of 18¿ or 20¿.
In the second and third round, the students understand the game better, and the
prices converge towards the equilibrium price 14¿. Table 3.4 shows that 14¿ is indeed
the equilibrium price.
p1 18 16 14 12 10
π1 124 136 140 136 124
π2 180 160 140 120 100
π1 + π2 304 296 280 256 224
Table 3.4: Best response of manufacturer 1 if manufacturer 2 sets p2 = 14 (all amounts in ¿).
In phase 2, the equilibrium price equals 22¿. We usually indeed observe that the prices
increase after the increase of the reciprocal fee.
We start the discussion by showing shortly with a table similar to Table 3.4 that 22¿
does indeed constitute an equilibrium. After the students understand the equilibria in
phase 1 and 2, we discuss why they are different. It is helpful to write down the profit
function of one of the manufacturers:
π1 = p1q1(p1, p2) − fq1(p1, p2) + fq2(p2, p1). (1)
The profit equals the revenues minus the outgoing licensing payment plus the incoming
licensing payment. We often start with referring to the symmetric equilibrium, and raise
the question why f affects the equilibrium prices if the incoming and outgoing licensing
payments cancel each other. This puzzles many students. However, there are usually some
students that understand that f matters because it affects their willingness to increase
the price. The higher f is, the less they are concerned with raising the price, because
the profit margin is smaller, and because, at the same time, losing own production is less
problematic as the incoming licensing revenue increases stronger.
Students typically start thinking quickly ‘at the margin’. At this point, looking at the
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Eq. (2) shows that the last two terms increase in f . Hence, the first part has to become
even smaller (more negative), i.e., p1 is larger. More intuitively, the equation shows that
for a larger f , the latter parts – the licensing payments – become more relevant. For
a larger f , the company saves outgoing licensing payments when it increases the price,
and at the same time, it receives more incoming licensing payments. Hence, a larger f
increases the incentives to increase the price. That the payments cancel out in equilibrium,
is then a consequence of the symmetry between the manufacturers. If one wants to avoid
derivatives, it is also possible to argue with plus and minus signs in Eq. (1).
The experiment illustrates how reciprocal royalty payments dampen competition, and
drive up prices. As the royalty f is endogenous in a cross-licensing agreement, the patent
owners have incentives to choose f relatively high, driving up prices for consumers.
The results can be used to discuss examples of such cross-licensing agreements in prac-
tice. In addition to the details of licensing contracts (OECD, 2019), standard-essential
patents seem to be particularly interesting (see, e.g., Baron and Spulber, 2018). Further-
more, the relationship of licensing and antitrust concerns are of importance for future
decision makers. FTC (2017) serves as a good starting point for a detailed discussion of
the latter.
It is also useful to link the two experiments together. It is worthwhile to recall what we
discussed in the end of the first experiment: patent pools as one potential way to resolve the
royalty-stacking problem. However, patent pools often include cross-licensing agreements.
Experiment 2 shows that cross-licensing in patent pools may have anti-competitive effects.
This implies a potential downside of using patent pools to solve the royalty-stacking
problem. Both experiments can also be used as starting points for a deeper discussion of
patent thickets (see, e.g., Shapiro, 2000).
Finally, in order to highlight the importance of the mechanism beyond technology
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licensing, one can link to another setting where the mechanism is present. In most com-
munication networks, network operators charge reciprocal access fees (termination fees)
for consumers to access other networks. One example is the mobile phone market (see,
e.g., Armstrong, 1998). Here, consumers choose their mobile network operator indepen-
dently, and call other consumers regardless of their choice of network operator. When
calling a participant in another network, operators charge a termination fee. These termi-
nation fees were initially set endogenously by the telecommunication companies, and led
then to abusively high fees. They have later been regulated ex-ante by telecommunication
authorities.
More in-depth analysis of royalty stacking can be found in, e.g., Lemley and Shapiro
(2007), Rey and Salant (2012) and Schmidt (2014); more details on cross-licensing in, e.g.,
Katz and Shapiro (1985), Fershtman and Kamien (1992) and Jeon and Lefouili (2018).
Finally, combinations of the two topics are analyzed in, e.g., Lerner and Tirole (2004) and
Shapiro (2000).
4. Implementation for digital teaching
The classroom experiments are also well suited for online teaching. We have performed
both experiments successfully using video telephony software. The experiment and dis-
cussion can proceed almost according to the instructions. The relevant material should
be made available for download during the lecture. The easiest way of forming groups is
to use the breakout rooms. Each breakout room – which can consist of just one student
– represents one decision maker, and is matched with one other breakout room. In small
classes, the decisions can be collected by visiting the breakout rooms. For larger classes
we recommend using an additional digital survey tool, for example, Google forms. The
survey should ask for the group ID and the decision. Discussions after each round take
then place in the plenary session.
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5. Conclusion
We presented two classroom experiments on technology licensing. The experiments are
designed to engage students discussing licensing from a business perspective. The exper-
iments can be used to discuss different kind of licensing contracts, patent pools, patent
thickets, and technology standards and standard-essential patents. Furthermore, the ex-
periments highlight the relationship between licensing and antitrust concerns. The target
course for the experiments are innovation courses for business and economics students
and courses on competition policy for business, economics and law students.
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 Instructions (see below)
 Pairs of numbers to match groups (printed on pieces of paper)
 Excel sheet to record the results
A.2. Royalty stacking: Instructions
Instructions
In this experiment, each of you will be assigned the role of a patent owner. Two
patent owners will be matched with one another at the start of the game and
will remain matched throughout the game. As a patent owner, you will license your
technology to a manufacturer. In order to produce, the manufacturer requires access
to both of your technologies - she is not able to produce otherwise.
Both patent owners will independently set their per unit royalty. The production
level of the manufacturer depends on the sum of the royalty payments and is given
by:
Sum of royalties (in ¿) 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Units sold 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Your job:
 Select the per unit royalty for your technology that maximizes your profit.
You make this decision at the same time as the second patent owner.
 As you only grant access to your technology, there are no additional costs.
Thus, your profit is simply your royalty multiplied by the units produced by
the manufacturer.
 At the end of each period, please record your per unit royalty, the number of
units sold, and your profits on the record sheet provided.
 All patent owners are reading the same instructions as you are now.
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A.3. Cross-licensing: Instructions
In this experiment, each of you will be assigned the role of a manufacturer. Two
manufacturers will be matched with one another at the start of the game and will
remain matched throughout the game.
As a manufacturer, you require access to the technology of your competitor pro-
tected by a patent. At the same time, you own a patent that protects another
technology that is required for production by you and your competitor. You enter
into a cross-licensing agreement, and pay each other a reciprocal per unit royalty
(i.e., a royalty rate that applies for both of your technologies) of 2¿.
Both of independently set your final prices independently. You are able to set one
of the following prices:
Possible prices (in ¿) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Your demand depends on the difference of prices:
Your price - other’s price ≥10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 ≤-10
Your quantity 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Other’s quantity 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
Your job:
 Select the price that maximizes your profit. You make this decision at the
same time as the second patent owner.
 You have no production costs in addition to the royalty . Thus, your profit is
given by (Your Price - 2 ¿) · Your Quantity + 2 ¿ · Other’s quantity
 At the end of each period, please record your price, the number of units sold,
and your profits on the record sheet provided.
 All manufacturers are reading the same instructions as you are now.
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